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NOTES 
TAYLOR V. POLACKWICH: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF 
UNMARRIED COHABITANTS-
FROM MARVIN TO EQUITY 
The legal order can exist only to the extent that 
social conduct is oriented to it. Law that is too 
divergent from social reality undermines the re-
spect for and the rule of law.' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Taylor v. Polackwich,2 the trial court achieved an equita-
ble and just result regarding the division of property acquired 
during cohabitation.3 The appellate court reversed on the 
grounds that the remedy was not grounded in law or equity.4 In 
reaching such a result, the appellate court diverged from and 
was not responsive to the social realities of modern times. 
Cohabitation has become a significant minority lifestyle m 
1. Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Board, 131 Cal. App. 3d 946, 958, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 708, 715 (1982) (Feinberg, J., concurring), rev'd 34 Cal. 3d 1, 633 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. 
Rptr. 134 (1983). In Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Board, the supreme court was 
faced with a situation where the appellate court ruled that an engaged cohabitant was 
entitled to receive unemployment compensation. The relevant statute provided that 
compensation was payable when a worker voluntarily left his or her job if there was a 
showing of good cause. Leaving a job in order to be with a spouse was presumed to be 
good cause, and the appellate court agreed that leaving a job in order to be with a fiance 
was also good cause. However the California Supreme Court reversed. Norman v. Unem-
ployment Insurance Board, 34 Cal. 3d at 3, 663 P.2d at 905, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The 
court held that public policy dictated a judgment declaring that leaving a job in order to 
be with a fiance or cohabitant was not good cause. Id. at 6, 663 P.2d at 907, 192 Cal. 
Rptr. at 137. The dissent argued that good cause should not be presumed, as it is with 
marriage, but may be proven, depending upon the facts of the individual case. Id. at 14, 
663 P.2d at 913, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 143. See also Survey; Women and California Law, 14 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 785, 833 (1984). 
2. 145 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1983). 
3. For the purpose of this paper, cohabitation will refer to unmarried couples living 
together in an intimate relationship. This paper will focus on relationships in which both 
parties know they are not legally married. 
4. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1020, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 12. 
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the United States, with relationships strongly resembling hus-
band and wife commitments.~ In 1970 and 1980, there was a 
200% increase in the number of unmarried couples sharing 
households.6 This trend is likely to continue,7 as there has been 
an increase in the recognition of rights of unmarried couples8 
and public attitudes regarding cohabitation have changed. For-
merly, cohabiting couples were labelled "meretricious,"9 which 
connotes wrongdoing. More recently courts have taken judicial 
notice of cohabitation, preferring such terms as "nonmarital 
partners" or "nonmarital relationship. "I 0 
Taylor represents a typical cohabitation situation in three 
different respects: the man was the primary earner while the wo-
man worked part time and was the homemaker, at her partner's 
request;l1 the parties neither completely combined nor kept sep-
arate their money; and at trial the parties offered conflicting tes-
timony regarding their expectations and intentions. 
This note examines the rights of unmarried partners upon 
separation in regard to the division of property acquired during 
cohabitation. It will be argued that adherence to the governing 
law does not achieve equitable results. This note proposes that a 
more equitable division of property acquired during cohabita-
tion may be realized through application of community property 
principles.12 
5. Comment, Consortium Rights of the Unmarried: A Time for A Reappraisal, 15 
FAM. L.Q. 223, 251 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Consortium Rights). 
6. BUREAU OF CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS SERVICES PUB. No. 365, Marital Status and Living Ar-
rangements: March, 1980, at 4 (1981). 
7. Comment, Consortium Rights, supra note 5, at 223-24. "Demographers at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University estimate that by 1990 
only slightly more than a quarter of all households in the nation will consist of married 
couples with children. New York Times, May 23, 1980, at 18. The study based its predic-
tion on the continuation of present trends, including cohabitation." [d. at 224 n.7. 
8. [d. at 231-35. 
9. The dictionary defines meretricious as "of, pertaining to, characteristic of, or be-
ing a prostitute." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1539 (2d ed., 1948). 
10. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 
819 (1976). 
11. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1020, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 11. 
12. See infra notes 73-94 and accompanying text. While the California Supreme 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FACTS OF TAYLOR 
The parties lived together for eight years without marrying. 
After they separated, Janina Taylor sued Joseph Polackwich to 
establish a one-half interest in property they acquired while liv-
ing together. 
Early in their relationship, Polackwich moved into Taylor's 
apartment. When he became impatient with the landlord, he 
told Taylor to look for a house to buy in which he, Taylor, and 
her seven minor children would live. Taylor found a house and 
Polackwich decided to buy it. The purchase price was $27,950. 
Polackwich paid a down payment of $6,000 and took title in his 
name. A monthly payment of $184 was automatically deducted 
from his wages. The parties agreed that each month Taylor 
would deposit $205 into Polackwich's checking account. This 
was the same amount that Taylor had been paying in rent 
before she moved into the house. For a year and a half, Po-
lackwich gave Taylor rent receipts, which she used to prove to 
AFDC that she was paying rent. At the time of trial, Taylor had 
paid more than $14,000 toward the purchase of the house-more 
than twice as much as Polackwich. 
Polackwich paid the taxes and the insurance and purchased 
furniture for the house. He also spent $600 to $700 per month 
for food for the entire household. In 1974, he executed a will 
leaving all his property to Taylor and her children and made 
Taylor the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, employee sav-
ings plan, and profit-sharing plans. 
Taylor worked outside the home, yet did not earn nearly as 
much as Polackwich.13 However, she used the bulk of her salary 
Court has stated that the Family Law Act does not address the property rights of 
non marital partners, and therefore community property laws do not apply to unmarried 
people, the court has also noted that the delineation of the rights of nonmarried partners 
is a judicial matter. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829. This 
note suggests that in cohabitation situations, equity is not achieved under the current 
state of the law; and in order for the court to respond to prevailing trends, the rights of 
non married partners must be reexamined. 
13. At the time of the trial, Polackwich was earning $19,625 per year, with an an-
nual pension of $4,852 from the Navy. Taylor was earning $9,000 per year. Taylor, 145 
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to make house payments and meet household expenses. 
At trial, the parties gave conflicting testimony as to whether 
they had agreed to share earnings, property, and expenses. Tay-
lor testified that she and Polackwich agreed that he would make 
the down payment and that she would make the monthly pay-
ments. She also testified that it was their understanding that the 
house had been purchased for "all of US."14 Taylor stated that 
she was not concerned that title to the house was in Po-
lackwich's name because Polackwich had told her that he would 
take care of her and the children. That was good enough for her. 
She claimed that while the parties lived together they agreed to 
treat all of their property and ·earnings as joint property. Since 
Taylor trusted Polackwich, she relied on him to fulfill that 
agreement. 
On the other hand, Polackwich testified that they did not 
agree to pool their earnings or share expenses. Hi He claimed that 
he had told Taylor that he took title to the house in his name 
because it was his and he wanted to control it as long as he 
lived. 16 He testified that he wished to maintain a landlord-ten-
ant relationship with her, and that as long as they remained in a 
committed relationship, she and her children could live in the 
house. Polackwich claimed he had told Taylor that if the rela-
tionship terminated, he would "withdraw" all the rights he had 
given her.17 
B. THE TAYLOR DECISION 
At trial, Taylor sought a one-half interest in the house, in 
the furniture, and in other accumulated property on two theo-
Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 11. 
14. [d. at 1018, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 10. 
15. [d. at 1018, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 11. 
However, it is hard to reconcile Polackwich's claim with the fact that he had given 
Taylor a' power of attorney to withdraw funds from both his savings and checking ac-
counts. Polackwich also conceded that Taylor "spent all the money she wanted without a 
question asked" and that he "footed the bill." [d. 
16. [d. Polackwich stated that after he died, Taylor could have the house. 
17. [d. 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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ries: contract and constructive trust. 18 The trial court found that 
the evidence did not establish either an express or an implied 
contract or that the acquired property was joint property.19 The 
court also rejected Taylor's claim of an interest in the property 
under the constructive trust theory.2o However, the trial court 
did render an equitable solution: 
[E]quity requires some further assistance to 
plaintiff from defendant in order that plaintiff 
can rehabilitate herself .... [Therefore] judg-
ment [is] entered granting plaintiff the exclusive 
right to reside with her children in the house until 
July 1, 1984, provided that plaintiff pay defen-
dant rent of $236 per month from July 1, 1980 to 
June 30, 1984 and pay as additional rent any in-
crease in real property taxes or insurance on the 
house; granting defendant the right to sell or refi-
nance the house subject to plaintiff's right to re-
side therein; awarding to plaintiff "as her sole and 
separate property" all of the furniture, furnish-
ings and appliances in the house; and ordering de-
fendant to pay to plaintiff $1,000 as moving costs 
upon her vacation of the premises.21 
Polackwich successfully appealed the rehabilitative award 
and Taylor cross-appealed the decision not to award her an in-
terest in the house. The appellate court determined that the re-
habilitative award could not stand because it was without a le-
gal22 or equitable basis.23 
The appellate court conceded that Taylor needed Polackwich's 
assistance after the separation in order to maintain the lifestyle 
she and her children had enjoyed while living with Polackwich,24 
but nonetheless stated that "[r]emedies may be fashioned only 
18. Id. at 1019, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 11. 
19.Id. 
20. Id. at 1019, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 12. 
21. Id. at 1019-20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 12. 
22. Id. at 1020, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 12. The court noted that the trial court found there 
was no contract between the parties to treat property acquired while they lived together 
as joint property. The court also affirmed the decision not to award Taylor an interest in 
the house under the theory of constructive trust. 
23. Id. at 1022-23, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 14. The court also found that the jury believed 
the evidence did not show that Polackwich agreed to provide Taylor with financial sup-
port in the event that the parties ceased living together. 
24. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 13. 
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to enforce rights, not to meet the needs of one party or to 
achieve what the court perceives to be 'equity' in a given situa-
tion."26 The court concluded that the rehabilitative award 
granted by the trial court could not stand because there was no 
"legal or equitable obligation on Polackwich's part to provide 
Taylor and her children with a place to live, or to furnish them 
with support in any form."26 
C. CALIFORNIA LAW REGARDING PROPERTY RIGHTS OF SEPARAT-
ING UNMARRIED COHABITANTS 
In a narrow decision the California Supreme Court in Mar-
vin v. Marvin27 declared the governing law in California for the 
separation of cohabiting couples. The Marvin court acknowl-
edged that unmarried cohabitants should not be barred because 
of their relationship from asserting the contractual rights and 
remedies available to other persons.28 The court enunciated the 
following policy considerations for applying equitable relief in 
cohabitation situations: 
[Non-married] parties may well expect that prop-
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. In Mar- . 
vin, a woman brought an action against a man with whom she had lived for six years. 
She alleged that they had entered into an oral agreement to combine efforts and earnings 
and to share equally the property accumulated through individual or combined efforts. 
At the time of the Marvin suit, the general rule in California was that absent an agree-
ment to pool incomes or assets, and absent a finding that both parties contributed mone-
tary funds to the purchase of the property in question, the property belonged to the 
party in whose name the legal title stood. See Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 684-85, 
134 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1943). 
The Washington Supreme Court recently ruled on this point. In In re Marriage of 
Lindsey, _ Wash. 2d _, 678 P.2d 328 (1984), the court overruled the presumption 
that parties intended to dispose of their property exactly as they did dispose of it, and 
that absent a trust relation, property belongs to the party who retains legal title. Instead, 
the Lindsey court adopted the rule that trial courts must examine the property accumu-
lations during a nonmarital relationship and make a just and equitable disposition of the 
property. 
This differs from the narrow Marvin holding because under Lindsey, recovery is not 
limited to traditional legal and equitable theories. See infra notes 38-67 and accompany-
ing text. Lindsey may signify a trend in the courts toward a more progressive evaluation 
of the rights of cohabitants as this note suggests. 
28. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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erty may be divided in accord with the parties' 
own tacit understanding and that in the absence 
of such understanding the courts will fairly ap-
portion property accumulated through mutual ef-
fort. We need not treat non-marital partners as 
putatively married partners in order to ... ex-
tend equitable remedies; we need to treat them 
only as we do any other unmarried persons . . . . 
[I]n any event the better approach is to presume 
. . . "that the parties intend to deal fairly with 
each other. "29 
751 
Furthermore, the court held that express contracts between 
unmarried cohabitants should be enforced unless the contract 
was explicitly founded on the consideration of sexual services. so 
The court stated that where there is no express agreement, "the 
courts may look to [the following] variety of other remedies in 
order to protect the parties' lawful expectations:"s. implied con-
tract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture; con-
structive trust; resulting trust; quantum meruit; or some other 
tacit understanding between the parties.32 In a footnote, the 
court noted that its opinion "does not preclude the evolution of 
additional remedies to protect the expectations of the parties to 
a nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing remedies 
prove inadequate; the suitability of such remedies may be deter-
mined in later cases in light of the factual setting in which they 
arise."33 
On remand, the trial court fashioned an additional remedy, 
pursuant to the supreme court's direction. Although the trial 
court held that none of the theories articulated by the supreme 
court applied, it stated that the footnote in the supreme court 
opinion authorized rehabilitative awards and awarded plaintiff 
Michelle Marvin $104,000.34 The trial court based the award on 
the harm to Marvin's career as an entertainer caused by the 
years during which she stayed at home to serve as homemaker 
and companion to the defendant. The court concluded that the 
29. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. 
33. Id. at 684 n.25, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25. 
34. See Marvin v. Marvin, 5 FAM. L. REP. 3077 (1979). 
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purpose of the award was to give Marvin the economic means to 
pursue an education and to learn new, employable skills. 
The rehabilitative award in Marvin was similar to that ren-
dered by the trial court in Taylor. Both decisions were reversed 
on appea1.35 When the Marvin rehabilitative award was ap-
pealed to the California Supreme Court, it denied hearing. In 
reversing the trial court, the appellate court in Marvin stated 
that since there was no obligation to provide a reasonable sum 
for support and maintenance, and since there was no damage, 
unjust enrichment, or wrongful act, there was no basis in law or 
equity for a rehabilitative award.36 According to the appellate 
court, the trial court's findings: 
merely established plaintiff's need therefore and 
defendant's ability to respond to that need. This 
is not enough. The award . . . must be supported 
by some recognized underlying obligation in law 
or equity. A court of equity admittedly has broad 
powers, but it may not create totally new substan-
tive rights under the guise of doing equity.S? 
The appellate decision deleting the rehabilitative award in 
Taylor was therefore correct, at least in its reliance on prece-
dent. Yet these decisions are disturbing, particularly because the 
trial courts in both Marvin and Taylor, after hearing the parties' 
testimony, rendered rehabilitative awards in attempts to reach 
equitable results as the California Supreme Court had suggested. 
The next section explores the theories suggested by the 
Marvin court and the problems that arise when trying to apply 
them to a typical cohabitation situation like Taylor. The analy-
sis concludes that such theories do not work in cohabitation sit-
uations because the Marvin theories are commercial and con-
tractual in nature and are inappropriate in domestic situations, S8 
35. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (1981) 
hearing denied (Oct. 7, 1981). 
36. Id. at 876-77,176 Cal. Rptr. at 559. 
37. Id. at 876, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 559. 
38. For example, the supreme court in Marvin cited In re Estate of Thornton, 81 
Wash. 2d 72, 449 P.2d 864 (1972), as an example of an implied contract. Marvin, 18 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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and because courts seem unwilling to apply them in an equitable 
fashion. 
III. FROM MARVIN TO EQUITY 
A. EXPRESS CONTRACTS 
Contracts regarding property interests into which parties 
enter either before or while living together are now enforced by 
courts.39 The contracts may be written or oral, and must be free 
from fraud, duress, and other defects. In Marvin, the supreme 
court held that cohabiting partners should be given the same ju-
dicial recognition as any two contracting parties.40 
However, the contract theory provides little protection for 
cohabitors because it requires parties to contract during their re-
lationship, regarding their separation. When parties are emo-
tionally and intimately involved, signing a contract regarding 
property interests in the event of separation is rarely consid-
ered.41 Oral contracts may be more likely but, as in Taylor, they 
are difficult to prove. Typically, when in court, separating par-
ties give conflicting testimony. Under the contract theory, the 
court is forced to find for one party instead of fashioning an eq-
uitable remedy which benefits both and eliminates any unjust 
Cal.3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. In Thornton, the unmarried couple 
entered into the business of raising cattle, combining their experience, labor, and skills. 
Both parties participated in the decisions and day-to-day management of the business, 
and both contributed to the success of the business. The court held that the business 
belonged to both parties, not just the one who held title. While this implied partnership 
is quite appropriate in Thornton, it cannot be said that this theory accurately protects 
most cohabitation situations, since most couples do not go into business together. For 
excellent criticisms of Marvin, see Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Differ-
ent Perspective, 28 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 1125 (1981); and Simitian, Property Rights of Un-
married Homemakers: Marvin v. Marvin and the California Experience, 5 COMMUNITY 
PROP. J. 3 (1978). 
39. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. 
40. Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. The court stated that as long 
as an agreement does not rest upon the performance of sexual services, cohabiting part-
ners "may order their economic affairs as they choose, and ... no policy precludes the 
courts from enforcing such agreements." Id. 
41. The protections afforded married couples affirms this point. The primary 
cohabitor relationship-marriage-does not require the parties to contemplate property 
. settlements upon dissolution, as the law provides settlement laws for them. However, 
such a scheme is not afforded other cohabitors; they find no protection under the law. 
Therefore, they must contract regarding property settlement when no separation is 
contemplated. 
9
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enrichment. For instance, since Taylor's testimony was not 
enough to convince the court that a contract existed,'&2 the trial 
court found that no express contract existed between the par-
ties43 and Taylor was ultimately left without a remedy. The facts 
of Taylor are not unique. Therefore, the contract theory will al-
most always prove to be inadequate to reach equitable results in 
comparable situations. 
B. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS 
In an implied-in-fact contract, the court implies that the 
parties intended to contract. Intent can be shown not only by 
words, but by conduct and acts.44 Recovery is usually based 
upon a showing that plaintiff rendered services or supplied a 
product with the expectation of monetary reimbursement.411 The 
basis of recovery is quantum meruit-what is deserved!6 
In Taylor, Taylor 'argued that while the parties lived to-
gether she cooked, washed, shopped, and generally took care of 
Polackwich. She cared for him when he was sick, entertained his 
co-workers, and helped him with a correspondence course which 
would advance his career. However, under the law of implied-in-
fact contracts, Taylor could not recover for these household ser-
vices unless she could prove that she expected to be reimbursed 
financially. Yet parties in intimate relationships do not expect 
monetary reimbursement for their work in the home. Taylor's 
expectations are more accurately reflected by her belief that her 
42. It is unlikely that a party in Taylor's position would have any witnesses to cor-
roborate the existence of an oral agreement to consider all property as joint property. 
43. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The trial court could have 
found an express oral contract in light of the fact that Polackwich gave Taylor power of 
attorney over his bank accounts. The question remains whether judicial bias was at work 
here. The court seems to have found it more expedient to award property to the party 
who held title, rather than attempt to develop an equitable basis for shared ownership 
interests in the property. 
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4, comment a (1979). 
45. A "nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value 
of household services rendered less the reasonable value of support received if he can 
show that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward." Marvin, 18 
Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. 
46. [d. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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reimbursement for performing household services was that she 
was a joint owner in all property acquired by the couple.47 The 
implied-in-fact contract theory, by the Marvin definition, does 
not protect that expectation because it requires an expectation 
of monetary reimbursement. 
C. IMPLIED-IN-LAW CONTRACTS (QUASI CONTRACTS) 
Implied-in-Iaw contracts are created by law as a form of eq-
uitable relief to obtain justice and prevent unjust enrichment.48 
They are not based upon the apparent intentions of the parties 
or promises between the parties. Therefore, for Taylor to recover 
under this theory, she had to show that Polackwich was unjustly 
enriched. However, recovery is not allowed if sufficient consider-
ation by the party allegedly unjustly enriched is shown, since 
consideration defeats the claim of unjust enrichment. 
Taylor claimed Polackwich was unjustly enriched because 
he was awarded the house despite the fact that he only paid the 
$6,000 down payment, insurance, and taxes.49 In contrast, Taylor 
provided household services, paid $14,000 of the mortgage, and 
used the bulk of her salary to meet household expenses. Never-
theless, the court felt that the support Polackwich provided for 
Taylor and her children was sufficient consideration, thereby 
precluding Taylor'S recovery under this theory. The court 
stated: 
[D]efendant contributed to the support of plain-
tiff and the children, enabling them to enjoy a 
standard of living superior to that which they had 
experienced before residing with defendant in the 
house; such contributions by defendant were 
47. Respondent's Answering Brief at 4, Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 194 Cal. 
Rptr. at 8. For a discussion of Taylor's reasonable expectations see supra note 14 and 
accompanying text. 
It is possible that Taylor would not even have agreed to live with Polackwich and 
pay the $205 per month if she had known that she would not acquire any interest in the 
property. It is also possible that she would not have left an affordable apartment if she 
had known that upon breaking up with Polackwich she would have no place to live. This 
may be why the trial court awarded equitable relief. Yet the appellate court struck down 
the award because it found no implied contract. 
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4, comment b (1959). 
49. Cross· Appellant's Opening Brief at 23, Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 194 
Cal. Rptr. at 8. 
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equal to, if not greater than, the contributions to 
the household made by plaintiff in the form of 
services and money. ~o 
The court further found that Taylor's payments constituted 
rent which she paid to her landlord, Polackwich, and rejected 
her claim of unjust enrichment. III This questionable result ap-
pears to be based entirely on Polackwich's testimony which di-
rectly contradicted Taylor's testimony on this issue. The court 
ignored the fact that parties in intimate relationships do not 
usually relate as landlord and tenant, and overlooked the facts 
that a lease was not drawn up, that there were no terms of the 
tenancy, and that the "rent" was never increased over an eight-
year period. Given the housing shortage in California, especially 
for families with many children,1I2 these factors make the court's 
conclusion even more questionable. 
The conclusion in Taylor is also difficult to accept because 
it means that while Taylor was part of a committed relationship 
with Polackwich,1I3 she was also subject, as a "tenant," to his 
whims with regard to whether or not she could live in the house 
that she had found and in which they made their home. Had the 
court found that Taylor acquired an interest in the property be-
cause of an implied-in-Iaw contract by virtue of the more than 
$14,000 she paid, a more equitable result would have been 
reached. Quite possibly, Polackwich could not have afforded the 
house without her payments. Therefore, a finding of an implied-
in-law contract would have prevented Polackwich's unjust 
enrichment. 
The finding of a landlord-tenant relationship in a case like 
this is indicative of the lengths to which a court will go in order 
to find that a defendant was not unjustly enriched. Therefore, 
50. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1022·23, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 14. 
5l. [d. at 1022, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 14. 
52. See Note, Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson: A Victory for Children in Rental 
Housing-Implications for Further Expansion of the Unruh Civil Right Act, 13 GOLDEN 
GATE U.L. REV. 697 (1983). 
53. Polackwich had told Taylor that he would probably marry her when he was 
ready, but that time never came. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1018, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 11. 
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this theory will likely prove inadequate in most cohabitation 
cases. 
D. RESULTING TRUSTS 
A resulting trust is similar to an implied-in-fact contract in 
that the intent of the parties to create a trust is implied by the 
court from the facts of the case.64 When a person purchases or 
furnishes money for the purchase of real property and allows ti-
tle to be placed in the name of a third person,55 the law 
presumes that the purchaser intended the third person to hold it 
in trust for the benefit of the purchaser. 56 This theory was not 
argued in Taylor. It appears to be inapplicable because Taylor 
did not provide the money for the purchase of the house. 
However, Taylor did make the monthly payments for six 
years. It is well-settled in California that each party is entitled 
to share in property jointly accumulated in the proportion that 
his or her funds contributed toward its acquisition.57 It is argua-
ble that Polackwich would not have been able to afford the 
house had he not been able to rely on Taylor making the 
monthly payments. In this sense Taylor did provide some of the 
money, indeed, a larger proportion than Polackwich, for the 
purchase of the house. In practice, this theory will prove to have 
the same inherent problems as the implied-in-fact contract the-
ory, and to date has not been successful when applied to cohabi-
tation situations. 
E. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 
When a person holding title to property would be unjustly 
enriched if she or he were permitted to retain it, a constructive 
trust arises. The titleholder then has an equitable duty to con-
vey all or part of it to another in order to avoid unjust enrich-
ment.58 Justice Cardozo has characterized the constructive trust 
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 404 (1957). 
55. Recall that Taylor was not concerned that title to the house was taken in Po-
lackwich's name. She believed that the parties had agreed that the house belonged to 
both of them. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1018, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 10. 
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 440 (1957). 
57. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d at 684-85, 134 P.2d at 762-63. 
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1936). 
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as "the formula through which the conscience of equity finds ex-
pr~ssion."59 In Omer v. Omer,60 cited in Marvin as a basis for 
applying the constructive trust theory in cohabitation cases, the 
court held that a finding of fraud or misrepresentation is not 
necessary in order to find a constructive trust.6! Omer further 
held that clear evidence of inherent unconscionability will justify 
application of the doctrine.62 
Taylor's claim that the court should impose a constructive 
trust and award her an interest in the house is based upon her 
actual monetary contribution to the acquisition and mainte-
nance of the property. The residence was purchased at a total 
price of $27,950. The down payment was just under $6,000, 
which Polackwich paid. Thereafter, Taylor paid $205 per month 
from September 1973 until July 1979. Thus, Taylor's monetary 
contribution, in excess of $14,000, was more than double that of 
Polackwich's contribution.63 
At the time of trial, both parties conceded that the value of 
the house was between $80,000 and $90,000. A conservative cal-
culation of the value of the property results in an equity of ap-
proximately $55,000. Taylor, as well as Polackwich, contributed 
to the acquisition of that equity.64 
The Taylor court explained that a "constructive trust may 
be imposed in practically any case where there is a wrongful ac-
quisition of property to which another is entitled."65 However, it 
held that there was no wrongful acquisition and no unjust en-
richment since Taylor's payments constituted rent.66 Elements 
59. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 NY 380, 386, 122 NE 378, 380 
(1919). Justice Cardozo explained that when property is acquired in circumstances such 
that the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, 
equity converts him into a trustee. [d. 
60. 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974). 
61. 11 Wash. App. at 390, 523 P.2d at 961. 
62. [d. 
63. Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at 23, Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 194 
Cal. Rptr. at 8 (1983). 
64. [d. at 23. 
65. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 13. 
66. [d. at 1022, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 14. 
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which may compel the imposition of a constructive trust were 
present in Taylor: the parties had a confidential67 relationship; 
Taylor contributed money to property held in Polackwich's 
name; and Polackwich was unjustly enriched at Taylor's expense 
when he was allowed to keep the property. Nevertheless the 
court failed to impose a constructive trust. 
Constructive trust is an equitable doctrine, which is used to 
remedy unjust enrichment. However, whether or not a party has 
been unjustly enriched is left to the court's discretion. If Taylor 
is indicative of how reluctant the courts are to apply the doc-
trine, it is doubtful that the theory will help other cohabitants in 
positions similar to Taylor's. 
IV. CRITIQUE 
A. CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Courts are required to carefully scrutinize the contracts, 
property transfers, and other business dealings of married peo-
ple, because their relationship is presumed to be confidential.68 
However, no such presumption is made for unmarried couples.69 
Instead, unmarried couples are presumed to be dealing with 
each other at arm's length. 70 
Parties in intimate relationships, however, do not deal with 
each other at arm's length. Indeed, the Marvin court recognized 
that business dealings between unmarried cohabitants may be 
tainted due to their personal relationships. The court noted that 
67. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
68. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Coffin, 63 Cal. App. 3d 139, 150-51, 133 Cal. Rptr. 
583, 588-89 (1976), where the court held that a husband's nondisclosure of a community 
property asset was a breach of his fiduciary duty and a basis for setting aside the prop-
erty agreement between the parties. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1983). 
69. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 355, 551 P.2d 323, 331, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 3, 11 (1976). The court questioned whether or not an antenuptial agreement 
had been tainted due to the exertion of undue influence. "Parties who are not yet mar-
ried are not presumed to share a confidential relationship." Id., citing Handley v. Hand-
ley, 113 Cal. App. 2d 280, 285, 248 P.2d 59; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 75 Cal. App. 2d 605, 611, 
171 P.2d 126 (1946). 
70. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Fernandez, 194 Cal. App. 2d 782, 791, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374, 
379 (1961), where the court refused to impose a burden upon the husband to show that 
an antenuptial agreement was fair, just, and fully understood by his wife since the par-
ties were not yet married when they entered into the contract. 
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a confidential relationship may be found between cohabitants if 
one has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or 
advise with the other's interest in mind.71 It seems clear that 
once it is determined that a confidential relationship exists be-
tween unmarried cohabitants, the court in a property division 
suit must scrutinize the property transactions in question. Any 
evidence of unfairness would, as in a marital relationship, justify 
a court's intervention in an attempt to reach an equitable result. 
In Taylor, the court should have carefully examined the al-
leged rental agreement. Had the court done this, it would have 
realized that due to their personal relationship, it was inconceiv-
able that a strict landlord-tenant relationship existed between 
Taylor and Polackwich. Having made this determination, the 
court would have been justified in fashioning an equitable 
remedy. 
As demonstrated above, the theories offered by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Marvin are, for the most part, inadequate 
in fashioning remedies for cohabitation situations. Usually, re-
covery is awarded only upon a determination that the parties 
intended to contract or form a trust, but actually failed to do 
SO.72 The problem with implying intentions in cohabitation situ-
ations is that, as in Taylor, upon separation parties will claim 
opposite intentions. Thus, more appropriate solutions need to be 
developed. 
B. ApPLICATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRINCIPLES 
Traditional marriage is no longer regarded as it once was. A 
recent sociological study concluded that marriage as an institu-
tion is in danger of collapse.73 Many people no longer see mar-
riage as the "perfect vehicle for fulfilling aspirations for inti-
macy."74 Indeed, it must be accepted that family relationships 
exist in our society in many forms other than traditional mar-
71. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 682 n.22, 557 P.2d at 121 n.22, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 n.22. 
72. See supra notes 44-67 and accompanying text. 
73. P. BLUMSTEIN & P.SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES, 318 (1983). 
74. [d. at 11. 
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riage, and that many people have chosen viable alternatives to 
marriage.711 Therefore, it is contended here that equity can only 
be accomplished when all families are given the same protection 
under our laws.76 
The community property system stresses unity and places a 
strong emphasis on shared ownership. Its presumption that com-
mon ownership is highly desirable is based on the theory that 
both partners contribute to the acquisition of property, regard-
less of who earned the money and who is the titleholder." There 
is no apparent reason why this approach should not be applied 
to unmarried cohabitants if their relationship is a partnership 
with the same elements as a traditional marriage.78 
If the community property system were applied to all estab-
lished family-like units, to all partnerships with identical ele-
ments (whether the parties were married or not), then the only 
issue to decide would be whether or not a cohabitation relation-
ship constituted a family.79 It is necessary, therefore, to look at 
75. In 1976, the Bureau of Vital Statistics for the State of California reported that 
there were 3,322 more petitions for marriage licenses than there had been in 1966. See 
Mitchelson and Glucksman, Equal Protection for Unmarried Cohabitants: An Insider's 
Look at Marvin v. Marvin, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 283, 284 n.3 (1977). Such a small num-
ber of marriage licenses in comparison to the large number of divorce petitions in the 
same year (See infra note 80) illustrates that people who are getting divorced are not 
remarrying, and is indicative of the fact that people are choosing family alternatives to 
traditional marriage. 
76. To acknowledge that family relationships exist outside of traditional marriage 
but to have different standards for determining property interests in non-traditional re-
lationships encourages a primary earner partner to do exactly what Polackwich did. He 
took title to all property in his name, never married, and enjoyed all the benefits of an 
intimate relationship. When he tired of the relationship, he left the non-earner/non-title-
holder with nothing, while he walked away with everything. 
77. Community property is all real and personal property acquired by a couple dur-
ing a valid marriage, with the exception of property received as a gift or as an inheri-
tance. Upon dissolution, the court ascertains the nature and extent of community assets 
and obligations. There is a mandatory obligation upon trial courts to distribute commu-
nity property equally. See In re Marriage of Knickerbocker, 43 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 1043-
48, 118 Cal. Rptr. 232, 235-38 (1974); In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 
267-68, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 498-500 (1972); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800(a), 4452 (West 1983 
and West Supp. 1984). 
78. See Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1978), (author argues that sharing based principles are desirable and 
should be extended to unmarried cohabitants). 
79. See Comment, The Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants-A Proposal, 14 
CAL. L. REv. 485, 505-06 (1979), [hereinafter cited as Comment, Property Rights], (au-
thor suggests that unmarried cohabitants should be treated the same as married people 
17
Rosen: From Marvin to Equity
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
762 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:745 
how the parties acted in order to determine whether their rela-
tionship constituted a family unit. 
The first question, then, is how must unmarried cohabitants 
act before they are afforded the same protection married couples 
receive under the community property system ?SO To answer this 
question, it must be determined whether any factors operate in a 
marriage and not in cohabitation that justify protecting only 
married partners.S1 If the elements of each relationship are es-
sentially the same then there should be equal treatment.S2 
Marriage has been described as follows: 
In marriage, most of us seek an alliance with an-
other individual who will believe in us; who will 
be loyal to us; who will help us function in a de-
manding, often hostile world; and who will help 
make life satisfying. In exchange we will try to do 
the same. Those needs and the expectations they 
create shape the frame of mind with which deci-
if a judgment states that there exists 1) an ostensible marital relationship, and 2) an 
actual family relationship). 
80. The Orner court stated in dictum that "proof of the relationship itself, its pur-
pose, duration, stability, and so forth, [should] determine the merits of [a] claim [by an 
unmarried cohabitant], and then, if warranted by the facts .... community property 
laws should be applied by analogy to determine the rights of the parties." Orner, 11 
Wash. App. at 389, 523 P.2d at 960. The Washington Supreme Court, however, refused 
to adopt the theory that certain relationships of long and durable standing may give rise 
to community property rights similar to those enjoyed by married people. See Thornton, 
81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864, 866-67. 
81. See Mitchelson & Glucksman, supra note 75 at 291-93. The authors argue that 
discrimination against unmarried cohabitors, on the basis of their marital status, cannot 
be constitutionally tolerated, since the real government interest is in promoting and pro-
tecting the family unit, not only traditional, marriage. They sqggest that while these 
terms might have once been synonymous, there are now many alternatives to marriage. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has never accepted this view and has 
limited their decisions strictly to promote marriage. See, e.g" Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374 (1978) for the Court's discussion of the fundamental right to marry. 
82. See Comment, Marvin v. Marvin: The Scope of Equity With Respect to Non-
Marital Relationships, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 49, 74 (1978). The author suggests that 
absent an overt intention to keep property acquired during non-marital cohabitation as 
separate property and/or a conscious effort not to contribute services or funds to the 
community, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the parties assumed the 
rights and duties of legal spouses with regard to property acquired during the relation-
ship. Then, if the presumption is not rebutted, equitable principles, such as quasi-mari-
tal property, should apply. 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss3/14
1984] FROM MARVIN TO EQUITY 
sions are made during the marriage. The expecta-
tion of stability and continuity and the desire for 
a shared life suggest that married people are un-
likely to make decisions on an individually ori-
ented basis; rather the needs of each person tend 
to be taken into account. Thus, married people 
will often make different decisions from those 
they would make if there were no marriage or 
marriage-like relationship functioning.s3 
763 
Many unmarried couples who cohabit have the same aspira-
tions as married couples .. These goals-love, sexual satisfaction, 
emotional intimacy, and trust-are the cornerstone of any suc-
cessful relationship.8-' 
Thus, an inquiry into whether or not a family relationship 
exists should focus on the following questions: Was the relation-
ship stable and significant? That is, did the parties view the re-
lationship as permanent? Did the parties plan for a shared life 
together?81i 
These questions can be answered by looking at the following 
83. Prager, Perspective on Marital Property Law, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME 
FEMINIST QUESTIONS 117 (B. Thome & M. Yalom ed. 1982). 
84. The expectations created by the search for the fulfillment of these goals are the 
same for unmarried cohabitants as they are for married couples, with one possible excep-
tion. It might be said that when people marry they are making a lifelong commitment, 
while those who choose to live together may have more ambiguous motives. In order to 
determine what couples think about the notion of a permanent relationship, it is helpful 
to look at certain decisions they have made. For example, when decisions are made that 
involve one partner sacrificing a career or career advancement, it is safe to assume that 
such a decision was prompted by the assumption that the relationship was a permanent 
one. 
It is not suggested that married couples and unmarried cohabitants always have the 
same expectations of permanence. Yet it must be noted that divorce has become quite 
common in our society. The Bureau of Vital Statistics for the State of California re-
ported that in 1976 there were 64,218 more petitions for divorces than in 1966. See 
Mitchelson and Glucksman, supra note 75, at 284, n.3. It can be argued that the fear of 
divorce looms just as large for married couples as the fear of separation looms for unmar-
ried cohabitants. 
85. A recent fourth district case held that unmarried cohabitants may state a cause 
of action for loss of consortium by showing that the nonmarital relationship was stable 
and significant. Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 71, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 
512 (1983). The court stated that evidence of stability and significance can be shown by 
the duration of the relationship, mutual contracts, the degree of economic cooperation 
and entanglement, exclusivity of sexual relations, and a "family" relationship with chil-
dren. [d. at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512. 
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factors. None of these factors are dispositive. Rather, courts 
must look at the totality of the circumstances and balance the 
respective rights of each party in an effort to protect the reason-
able expectations of each party. 
1) How did the couple hold themselves out to the commu-
nity?86 How did friends and family perceive the couple? How 
long did the parties live together?87 Was there a mutual dedica-
tion to family life?88 
2) Was there economic integration between the parties? Did 
they have joint bank accounts? Did they share purchases, ex-
penses, and investments? Was one party dependent on the other 
for financial support? Was there a voluntary assumption of 
debts and of providing for each other?89 
86. See Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 
V.C.L.A. L. REV. 1125, 1134-35, 1167 (1981), (author maintains that it. is fair to treat 
cohabitants as if they were married since most cohabitants feel that there is no differ-
ence between marriage and cohabitation). 
87. Id. at 1166. The author also suggests that two years of cohabitation, or cohabita-
tion of any period if a child was born to the couple during cohabitation, justifies treating 
the parties as if they were lawfully married for purposes of maintenance, property divi-
sion, intestacy, and elective share statutes. 
88. See, In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), 
which was one of the first California cases to award relief in a cohabitation situation. 
Paul Cary and Janet Forbes knew they were not married, yet together they purchased a 
home and other property, borrowed money, obtained credit, and filed joint income tax 
returns. They had four children. The children, as well as Forbes, used the last name 
Cary. 
The parties accumulated some real and personal property purchased with Cary's 
earnings. Had the parties married, this property would have been community property. 
When the parties separated, the trial court determined that the property should be 
equally divided, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that recovery in such 
situations required "that there be established not only an ostensible marital relationship 
but also an actual family relationship, with cohabitation and mutual recognition and 
assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obligations attending marriage." Id. at 353, 
109 Cal. Rptr. at 867. 
Eventually, the California Supreme Court rejected the Cary reasoning as being a 
strained interpretation of the Family Law Act. See supra note 12. The court concluded 
that the legislature, in enacting the Family Law Act, never considered the property 
rights of nonmarital partners. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. 
at 829. This may be true, but recovery need not be based upon the Family Law Act. 
Courts, as well as legislators, must recognize that it is logical to say that if parties lived 
and acted as a family, they should be treated as a family. 
89. See Comment, Property Rights, supra note 79, at 507-08. 
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How partners handled their financial affairs is indicative of 
whether they perceived their relationship to be a stable and per-
manent one. If the parties acted as if they were planning a life 
together this must be recognized at separation in order to pro-
tect the parties' reasonable expectations. 
3) Was there a voluntary division of labor and responsibil-
ity? Did one party make career sacrifices so that the other could 
advance?90 
4) Did the parties share the responsibility of ralsmg 
children ?91 
5) Was there a "tacit understanding" between the parties 
that whatever they acquired by mutual effort belonged to both 
of them?92 
Taylor and Polackwich both perceived their relationship as 
stable and permanent. They shared their money and they 
planned on marrying. Polackwich supported Taylor's children 
and helped raise them. Taylor wanted to go back to school, but 
didn't, at Polackwich's request.93 The parties had an actual fam-
ily relationship, an intimate relationship, without traditional 
marriage. Their family relationship should have been afforded 
the respect it was due, and community. property principles 
should have been applied. Had Taylor been reviewed under 
community property principles, Taylor would have been 
awarded an interest in the house.94 
90. See Prager, supra note 83, at 119. 
91. See Comment, Property Rights, supra note 79, at 507-08. See also In re Mar-
riage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (for a discussion of Cary, see 
supra note 88). 
92. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. ("The courts 
may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demon-
strates ... [a] tacit understanding between the parties.") Id. 
See also Folberg and Buren, Domestic Partnership: A Proposal For Dividing the 
Property of Unmarried Families, 12 WILLAME'ITE L.J. 453, 489-90 (1976), where the au-
thors conclude that absent an express contract to pool resources, there are currently no 
adequate remedies for dividing the property of an unmarried couple. They propose a new 
theory, entitled domestic partnership, where the central inquiry is whether there arose 
between the parties a legitimate expectation of a shared property interest in the accumu-
lation of the union. Where this question is answered in the affirmative, the principles for 
dividing marital property apply. 
93. Taylor, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 194 Cal. Rptr. at ll. 
94. All property is presumed to be community property when parties are married. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The legal community must begin to recognize family rela-
tionships outside traditional marriage. If cohabiting partners act 
like their property is jointly owned, they should be treated as 
joint owners by the courts regardless of marital status. Parties 
should always have the option of keeping their property sepa-
rate, but this would have to be a conscious choice evidenced by 
an agreement between the parties. Otherwise, it must be pre-
sumed that shared ownership principles are desirable whenever 
there is evidence that a relationship is stable and significant. 
Only when non-traditional families are recognized as viable 
and legitimate family units can a division of property upon sepa-
ration be truly equitable. Courts and legislators must recognize 
that traditional remedies are inapplicable in cohabitation situa-
tions. They must begin to respond to society's changing values. 
When the law does not respond to social reality, it is diffi-
cult to respect the law. The decision in Taylor occurred because 
the court applied traditional theories to a non-traditional situa-
tion-cohabitation. Indeed, "if our trial courts were free of rigid 
doctrinal analysis, legal presumptions, [and] high standards of 
proof . . . and could make determinations on the basis of the 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983). Upon dissolution, if the court finds that some of the 
property was acquired with separate property funds, a formula is applied which appor-
tions what is separate property and what is community property. In re Marriage of 
Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 
3d 841, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). 
In Taylor, if the $6,000 Polackwich used for the down payment was earned before 
the parties began living together, he would be entitled to approximately 22% of the eq-
uity in the house as his separate property. Any payments made with funds earned while 
the parties lived together entitle the community to share equally in the equity those 
funds provide. Therefore, if the money Taylor used for the monthly payments was 
earned while the parties lived together, the community would own approximately 50% of 
the house, entitling Taylor to approximately 25% of what the house was worth at 
dissolution. 
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facts and equity of the particular case, a just result could be 
achieved more often than it is presently."9~ 
95. Orner, 11 Wash. App. at 389-90, 523 P.2d at 960-61. 
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